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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
To evaluate personal welfare, members of society refer to their 
relative as well as their absolute incomes. When these relative 
comparisons are inconsistent with a group's sense of equity, conflicts 
in society are likely to emerge. Economic growth with a constant 
distribution of income leads to rising individual incomes, as well as 
a rising social standard. Thus, more income for the individual will 
mean increased happiness only if everyone's income has not similarly 
risen (Easterlin, 1973). The purpose of this dissertation is to focus 
on the process by which relative welfare comparisons produce one type 
of conflict--crime. Specifically, urban property crime will be viewed 
as an aggregate consumption externality associated with the distribu-
tion of income. 
Objective 
Criminal activity may be represented by the following multi-
plicative form: 
..... 
C = c1(X) c2(p) c3 (E). 
X a measure of the income distribution 
p - the probability of punishment 
E - ~ vector of random determinants 
1 
2 
It is assumed that potential criminals respond to all factors so that "C" 
is never zero. The first term, "C1 (X)". is the amount of crime that 
results because of relative income comparisons. The second term is 
based on the assumption that deterrence affects crime, through the 
->.. 
probability of being arrested and convicted. The third, 11 c3(E)", 
accounts for the other determinants .of crime, both psychological and 
sociological. 
The main objective of this study is to focus on that component of 
crime which is related to the distribution of income 11 c1 (X)". If people 
view the distribution of income from an individual perspective, then any 
perceived change in t~is distribution becomes a necessary condition for 
the committal or non-committal of a criminal act. The income distribu-
tion may therefore exhibit a certain degree of "publicness" in consump-
tion. To the extent that this is true, the standard pareto income-
leisure conditions will result in more criminal activity than is socially 
optimally, since no one takes into account the effect that individual 
incomes have on the income distribution and crime. 
This study differs from previous economic analyses of crime in 
essentially two ways. First, a theoretical model is presented which 
specifies relative income comparisons as an important determinant of 
criminal behavior. Second, criminal activity is viewed as an 
aggregate consumption externality or an "incidental" effect resulting 
from an income distribution which is not Pareto optimal. Crime 
affects everyone adversely, not just the victims, through a fear of 
being victimized. Many studies on the economics of crime have alluded 
to this external effect, although the major emphasis has been on the 
independent choice aspect ("c 2 (p)" above). 
From a public policy perspective, the existence of interdependent 
preferences implies an additional option for reducing crime: 
redistribution. The role of the local government is to determine how 
to optimally reduce the level of crime--by choosing that option which 
bas the highest benefit-cost ratio. In this case, I assume that there 
are only two options: income redistribution or deterrence. The 
proposed empirical formulation in this analysis examines the viability 
of these two alternatives as a measure of reducing criminal activity 
by a comparison of the relative magnitudes of their cost-effectiveness. 
The test does not assume the existence of any conscious public policy 
to reduce crime through transfers. Rather, it is simply a means to 
determine which option, redistribution or deterrence, has been most 
cost-effective. The study is undertaken for the New York City area. 
Outline 
Chapter II of t1!-is study will synthesize some recent work on 
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the economics and sociology of crime, and pareto optimal redistributions. 
Chapter III will provide a theoretical framework which hypothesizes 
that the distribution of income plays ~ significant role in explaining 
the level of criminal activity. An empirical model is developed in 
Chapter IV, and results of the analysis are presented in Chapter V. 
Finally, Chapter VI will review the findings and provide some sugges-
tions for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 
Crime is a major social concern which has received increasing 
attention in recent years. This chapter will analyze criminal behavior 
from a socio-economic perspective, since an adequate understanding of 
crime requires a multidisciplinary approach. 
To the economist, crime is rational behavior--a choice that is 
made by a person or persons in deciding how best to spend their time. 
In making the choice, individuals consider what they stand to gain 
and what they stand to lose; that is, they consider the benefits and 
costs of using their time in different ways--working legally, working 
illegally, or not working at all. An additional implication is that 
individuals have some knowledge, not necessarily perfect, of the 
benefits and costs associated with different actions. Because of the 
assumption of rationality, economists would hypothesize that economic 
decisions are the only necessary conditions for the committal of a 
criminal act. Therefore, any policy that would increase costs relative 
to benefits would deter crime. This does not imply that in every 
instance in which punishment increases one can expect to see crime 
decrease. There are other factors which also affect crime rates, such 
as material costs, psychic costs, etc. But economists would argue 
that, "ceteris paribus," an increase in expected punishment costs 
4 
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should reduce crime (Tittle, 1973). Finally, of course, there may be 
instances in which the assumption of rationality is not appropriate, 
for example, "crimes of passion."' 
To some sociologists, crime is considered to be deviant behavior. 
The deterrent effect of punishment concerns the role of sanctions in 
generating conformity. Much of the empirical research on the question 
of the ability of punishment to deter crime has been done by sociologists 
and socio-psychologists, although from a different perspective than 
economists, and perhaps sometimes with different expectations regarding 
the effectiveness of punishment. Sociologists may also focus on other ~ 
i 
aspects of criminal behavior, such as the motivation behind the deviant! 
behavior and the impact of class, race, or sex (Horton, 1973). 
Some of the concerns of sociologists and other social scientists 
who study criminal behavior have been incorporated within the economic 
model. The gains and costs of criminal behavior include psychic 
elements which is a ".catch-all" for all kinds of psychologic&l, 
sociological, and political phenomena. Most economic models of crime 
do not en~hasize or examine these phenomena, but they are nevertheless 
included and typically viewed as "exogenous" determinants--rnuch like 
tastes and preferences in consumer theory. On the subject of criminal 
motivation and class conflict, for example, it has been found that 
crime is related to the distribution of income, but such interactions 
have never been explained adequately in the economic literature on 
crime (Ehrlich, 1975). Consider the following example: one possible 
gain to a low-income ghetto resident from committing armed robbery 
may be the criminal's "psychic" benefits from achieving a more 
favorable position on the income scale. Since this act is included 
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in the average gain from crime, all effects as.a result of the committal 
of a criminal act are normally thought to be reflected in the market 
for crime. A moment of thought, however, should reveal this approach 
to be incorrect. First, the existence of a relative income comparison, 
or a concern for distribution, implies interdependent preferences. 
Thus, utility functions will be altered by a changing distribution and 
all of the relevant gains and losses will not be accounted for by the 
market. Second, crime affects everyone, not just the parties involved. 
One does not have to be a victim in order to be adversely affected by 
crime. 
The point of departure for the approach taken in this study from 
the orthodox view is the inclusion of the income distribution as a 
significant determinant of crime. Moreover, simce all relevant third 
party effects are not reflected in market adjustments, criminal behavior 
will be viewed as an aggregate externality associated with the distribu-
tion of income; "aggregate" because the identity of the individuals 
committing offenses are not important, only the overall level of crime. 
The Economics of Crime 
It is possible to distinguish between two different perspectives 
adopted in economic analyses of criminality. One approach stresses the 
role of preferences and free will in the analysis of choice and views 
the criminal as a selL:::interested, rational decision-maker. Differences 
in attitudes toward risk play a central role in explaining variations 
in crime, while environmental or institutional factors are virtually 
ignored by this approach. The other approach emphasizes environmen..t: 
and opportunities and suggests that crimes are directly or indirectly 
-~------~--------------
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determined by such economic factors as poverty, inequality, or the 
oppression of laws. Closely related to the latter approach is the set 
of hypotheses advanced by segmented labor market theorists who argue 
that though actors appear to make rational self-interested choices, 
their opportunities and preferences are actually determined by 
institutional arrangements. 
The choice theoretic approaches to the analysis of crime and 
punishment by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) closel mble the . (;tC . 
___- S 1' vvf Lis t.tlJW 
and Bentltmt1{1843). Beccaria,{~ utilitarian writings of Beccaria (1963) 
for example, argued the utilitarian principle that legislation should 
be formed and enforced so as to assure that the greatest happiness is 
shared by the greatest number. Laws are useful and necessary for the 
security and good of society, but punishments must be introduced to 
deter individuals from violating society's laws. 
Becker's work is based on almost identical premises as those of 
Beccaria: that opti~al enforcement of laws should follow from the 
utilitarian principle of minimization of social loss, and that illegal 
behavior can be understood in terms of rational decision making of 
free-willed individuals. The scarcity of resources demands that 
allocative decisions within the criminal justice system follow some 
social welfare objective. The objective proposed by Becker, minimization 
of social losses or costs, is deemed reasonable because traditional policy 
on punishment (i.e., defining appropriate levels of the certainty and 
severity of social sanctions) imposes costs on and produces benefits 
for offenders, victims, and society. 
8 
Ehrlich (1973) expands on Becker's theory by investigating the 
potential criminal's optimal allocation of time to crime and work. 
Making choices in the face of uncertainty, the individual chooses to 
enter or not to enter criminal activity in the process of maximizing 
expected utility, calculated for contingent states of the world. Since 
expected utility declines for increasing certainty or severity of 
punishment, optimal participation in crime declines with increasing 
punishment. 
The economic approach which places heavy emphasis on the structure 
of opportunities, the institutional environment in which decisions are 
made, and the stratification within the economy shares somewhat the 
Dutch criminologist, Banger (1969), added one more causal factor to the 
crime equation: cupidity. Bonger argued that poverty and cupidity are 
fundamental to the order of capitalist society and that measures of 
criminality vary directly with measures of cupidity and poverty. 
While few modern economists have adopted the Banger model without 
qualification, a number have begun to develop an approach toward the 
theory of criminality which is paralleled by the development of models 
of segmented or stratified labor markets. The first systematic descrip-
tion of criminal behavior within the context of segmented labor markets 
was provided by Piore (1978). In reflecting on the characteristics of 
jobs or workers in two distinct employment sectors, Piore argues that 
the behavioral patterns fostered by low-paying, menial, and unpleasant 
9 
"secondary labor market" jobs are reinforced by a lower-class life-style ~ 
which is more compatible with welfare and illicit activity than with 
legitimate employment. However, these same-behavior patterns--for 
example, lateness and absenteeism--tend to shape both the opportunities 
of disadvantaged workers and the characteristics of the jobs they face. 
In a sense, then, secondary labor market workers' actions are both 
determined and determining. 
In summary, two different perspectives exist among economic writers 
on criminality: rational free-willed and deterministic. The latter 
emphasizes opportunities and institutional barriers while the former 
'-----------·--·-··· .. ·- -·· ··---· 
highlights the deterrent effect of punishment. It must be noted, however, 
that even though the deterministic approach emphasizes the importance 
of economic factors, there is no mention or analysis of relative welfare 
comparisons. 
Critique of the Orthodox Approach 
The central findings of Becker and Ehrlich have not gone 
unchallenged. Block and Reineke (1975) argued that the Becker-Ehrlich 
results are based upon restrictive assumptions about the probability 
distributions for success or failure in criminal activity. In general. 
they found that the effects of the certainty and severity of punishment 
on optimal participation in crime are not determinate for arbitrary 
success or failure distributions. 
In spite of the apparent challenges on other grounds, it is 
interesting to note why the theorists writing in the Becker tradition 
have not addressed themselves to the issue of employment opportunities. 
First, employment policies cannot be shown to deter crime within 
10 
the context of the neo-classical model. Work and crime are assumed 
to be substitutes. As the expected return to one activity rises, the 
supply of the other falls. Recognizing the possibility that either a 
rise in the probability of punishment or a rise in the potential wage rate 
may•·reduce participation in illegitimate activity, it does not follow, 
at least in the orthodox approach, that improved employment opportunities 
will reduce crime. One might note here that when the neo-classical model 
is extended to include the possibility of a backward bending supply 
curve for illegitimate activity, it becomes theoretically possible that 
increased punishment may not reduce crime either. 
Secondly, the choices made to enter criminal activity are assumed 
to be of the same type as other economic choices, such as labor force 
participation, consumption, or investment in training and education. 
Hence, no special modeling effort is necessary in the neo-classical 
model to incorporate labor market behavior into a model of crime 
(unless there are external effects or special institutional barriers 
which inhibit the functioning of the market). 
Evidence of Crime and Employment 
Fleischer (1966) was one of the first modern economists to attempt 
to test econometrically the relation between employment opportunities 
and crime. Observed variations in crime rates were presumed to follow 
from changes in the demand and supply of crime. The demand for engaging 
in delinquent acts depended upon tastes for delinquency and on legiti-
mate alternatives to crime behavior. The supply of delinquency was 
assumed to result from opportunities to commit delinquent acts. Such 
opportunities vary with the victim's self-protection and economic and 
11 
social characteristics of the environment. Despite conceptual diffi-
culties with his model, Fleischer was able to explain a large percent 
of the variation in delinquency, using both time series and cross-
sectional data. Fleischer found that unemployment and mean income of 
the highest income quartile of families is negatively related to 
delinquency. This evidence is in conflict with the results of a 1958 
study by Glaser and Rice (1959) in which they found that increases in 
unemployment were associated with increases in crime among adults but 
with decreases in crime among juveniles. The U. S. National Commission 
on Law Observance and Enforcement (1971) has found that larcenies, 
homicides, and imprisonment rates rise with unemployment, but violent 
property crimes fall. On the other hand, Friendlander (1972), using a 
16-city cross-sectional sample in 1966, found crime to be negatively 
related to unemployment, thereby raising further uncertainties about 
the precise effect of employment opportunities on crime. 
Economists have consistently found that economic variables are 
significant. Recent works have attempted to use variables such as 
population density, migration, income dispersion, and labor-force 
participation rates in explaining variations in crime rates, but with 
little rationalization for how there variables interact (Forst, 1973). 
Variables of the "economic-factors-influencing-crime" variety are 
usually considered in studies testing a Becker-type model. For example, 
measures of income inequality, wealth, and race (percent non-white) are 
generally positive and significant in Ehrlich's equations (see footnote 
1, p. 14). However, unemployment is generally found to be insignificant. 
Cook (1975), in an analysis of a sample of Massachusetts parolees, 
concluded that improved job opportunities reduce the probability that 
;______ ------""" 
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an ex-offender will recidivate. Taggart (1972) and others have cited 
findings that suggest that participation in illegal activity is linked / 
to failure in the job market. Released offenders, however, have higher J 
turnover rates, higher unemployment rates, and lower wages than the 
general population, as Pownall (1971) shows. Does this evidence suggest 
that training of fenders or providing job counseling and referral services 
will reduce crime? In a review of a number of early manpower training 
efforts to improve the post-release labor market experiences of 
incarcerated offenders, Cook found that evaluations of the effectiveness 
of such efforts were generally inconclusive. Does this suggest that the 
problem is one of discrimination against ex-offenders? Cook concluded, 
no. He thought that the evidence from Pownall's study of ex-offenders 
in Baltimore and Philadelphia indicated, instead, that ex-offenders 
merely face the same poor employment prospects as other disadvantaged 
workers. The evidence should be viewed cautiously, especially in the 
light of Leonard's (1976) evidence suggesting that prior or current 
criminal record is generally regarded as grounds for dismissal from a 
job. Portnay (1970) has also noted similar restrictions on hiring 
former criminals in many skilled trades. 
A resurgence of interest by the Labor Department in the post-release 
labor market experiences of ex-convicts has stimulated a number of 
studies which should generate needed data for discovering how poor 
employment opportunities affect participation in crime and how criminal 
records affect employment opportunities. Yet, early evidence from an 
experiment in Baltimore, wherein parolees were randomly selected to 
either (1) receive cash subsidies until they found employment, or 
(2) receive job referral services and some employment counseling and 
training, or (3) both, suggested that only cash subsidies significantly 
altered the number of repeated offenses (Lenihan, 1976). 
13 
In view of the findings to date, it seems premature to conclude that 
an unambiguous relationship exists between crime and punishment, and 
employment opportunities and crime. This is not to be considered a 
repudiation of prior findings of a statistical association between crime 
and penal measures, unemployment rates, labor force participation rates, 
and other economic variables. It is merely a statement of caution when 
viewing these findings within an analytical perspective that does not 
take into account the institutional setting--for instance, the urban 
ghetto. Moreover, much of the focus on crime from an economic stand-
point has ignored the general equilibrium effects of engaging in 
illegal activity. It is obvious that the effects of crime on minority 
or ghetto communities transcend specific acts. In particular, a more 
general analysis of crime would reveal the interaction of participation 
in illegal activity and consumption patterns of both legal and illegal 
goods. Such an analysis, coupled with an identification of ghetto 
business decisions in response to crime, residential location and 
investment decisions, tax rates, and erosion of tax bases due to crime, 
would provide a basis for assessing the relative costs and benefits 
in ghetto communities of different anti-crime measures. 
The glaring omission of discussions of general equilibrium inter-
actions of crime, especially in urban areas, signifies a "void" in the 
economic literature on crime. In addition, there are some theoretical 
and empirical anomalies associated with both economic approaches. As 
mentioned previously, relative welfare comparisons cannot simply be 
treated as insignificant or ignored completely. The neo-classical 
model of crime includes these effects under th~ disguise of economic 
gains, while the segmented market approach ignores such comparisons 
completely--absolute measures of employment .opportunities and poverty 
are the most important. Economic variables, such as the income distri-
bution, have been found to have significant effects on crime, but no 
reason, a priori, has been given to explain the relation. 1 Many of the 
studies which have sought to explain criminal activity by unemployment 
have found conflicting results. 
Such inconsistencies are due to the theoretical inadequacies of 
both models--neither satisfactorily handles relative comparisons. The 
approach to be developed in this study will analyze crime from a 
general equilibrium and urban perspective. Illegal activity will not 
be treated exclusively as the outcome of a "rational" decision-making 
process. It will also occur as an incidental effect resulting from the 
income-leisure choice of the urban affluent. Much has.been said 
and written about growing income inequality creating feelings of 
malevolence, but no concise theoretical analysis has been established, 
-----------~ 
at least from an economic perspective. The economic literature on 
Pareto optimal redistributions and the sociological literature on 
delinquency provide a starting point for this analysis. 
1Ehrlich (1973) does confirm a positive relationship between crime 
rates and the degree of incqrne inequality. However, in his analysis 
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the median level of family income and the percentage of families with 
incomes below one-half the median are proxies for the returns from 
illegal and legal activities, respectively. These measures reflect 
general economic conditions, not utility interdependence, since 
individual utility, as specified by Ehrlich, is a function only of one's 
own consumption. 
Pareto Optimal Redistributions 
The first question to be answered is this: Given any initial 
distribution of income, is some redistribution necessary to achieve 
a Fareto optimum? Thurow (1971) gives several reasons why arbitrary 
initial distributions of income may not be Pareto optimal. 
Individuals care about the well-being of others, and may find it 
necessary'to redistribute their income to others. Alternatively, 
the income distribution itself may appear in utility functions, if 
there are externalities involved. Achieving an optimal levelof 
crime, for instance, may require an i.nco_Ill~ J:edistr-ibution that is 
- - . . - . " - -- --·-~---··-
Pareto efficient. Hochman and Rodgers (1969) argue that efficiency 
criteria can and should be applied to the redistribution of income 
through the 
~etitive 
fiscal process. The problem lies in the inability of the 
market to generate the required outcome. Individuals 
/ / may derive satisfaction from the income of others or an associated 
\
' group, or preferences may exist for a particular distribution. Either 
way, there are incentives to avoid payment. Voluntary transfers are 
~ 
unlikely to achieve an optimal distribution in the first case, and 
where the aggregate income distribution is concerned, its properties 
are not unlike those of a pure public good. Exclusion is impossible, 
consumption is non-rival, and each individual has a vested interest 
in not revealing his/her preferences to avoid paying the required share 
of the necessary taxes. 
In sum, then, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals 
have preferences concerning the proper distribution of income, 
independently from society's social welfare rankings collectively 
determined through the political process. It is clear, for instance, 
15 
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that people's behavior is sometimes motivated by altruism or envy. To 
the extent that this is true, the income distribution becomes a consumer 
externality and Pareto optimal redistributions are necessary for welfare 
maximization. 
Development of Deviant Behavior 
The final task is to examine what factors determine the pattern of 
tastes and preferences for crime. Much of the sociological literature 
on the causes of urban crime refers to concepts such as "social-class 
system", "inter-class conflict",."objective deprivation", etc. '\Vhen 
analyzing illegal behavior. Sociologists, ever since Ferri (1896), 
have been calling attention to factors such as environment and social 
status. Banger (1969) placed the blame for disproportionate crime and 
delinquency among the underclass on the pressures of the capitalist 
~\ 
in a capitalist society. The lower classes will always commit property )' 
crimes in order to gain a more favorable position on the income scale--
system. According to the Marxian point-of-view, crime is inevitable 
to succeed is imperative (Gordon, 1971). Marx himself wrote of the 
"working" class·' s desires to gain position in Bourgeois society (Marx, 
1978). 
Similar to the Marxian approach, but presented in a more rigorous 
manner is the anomie theory of Merton (1968). According to this theory, 
deviant behavior, at least in part, involves selective adherance to 
accepted social norms and occurs in areas of specific structural 
strains in a social system. Merton suggests that anomie develops 
., ''----
because of a breakdown in the relationship between goals that place 
great stress on success, and to which all groups in our society are 
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indoctrinated, without equivalent emphasis on institutional or legiti-
mate channels of access to these goals. In the areas where the 
discrepancy between goals and means is greatest, a condition of anomie 
prevails, and individuals resort to illegitimate means to achieve the 
goals. This implies that criminal activity is, to a certain extent, 
"generated" by the social system. 
A modification of Merton's theory appears in Cohen's (1976) theory 
of delinquent subcultures. This concept is also rooted in the 
discrepancy between goals and means. However, according to Cohen's 
f·~____.---..., ________ .. __ ~.------·----
f ormula tion, the d:li~ent ~culture is a reaction to socially and 
economically induced stresses that our social-class system inflicts on 
individuals. Crime results because the desire to achieve economic and 
social status is fulfilled by any means possible. 
In an alternative, but related approach, Toby (1967) attempts 
~----------
to explain why crime rates are rising rapidly in affluent societies. 
People steal, not because they are starving, but because they are 
envious of the possessions of others. The rise i~ living standards 
~----- ---- -
is associated not only with an improvement of the lifestyle of 
the elite groups; it is associated also with the "trickling down" 
of television sets, automobiles, radios, etc. to segments of the 
population who had not anticipated such good fortune. According to 
Toby when expectations of more equality in the distribution of consumer 
goods rise faster than the standard of living, individuals will attempt i 
/ to fulfill their expectations by committing p:ropert:y crimes. 
---~------------ .--------·-----"-
Many theories have been advanced to account for the development 
of criminal behavior, and explanations for delinquent behavior have 
varied within and across disciplines. The sociological approach, 
however, expands the analysis of crime well beyond the narrow 
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individual-centered theories that prevail in economics. Attempts by ( 
sociologists to relate delinquency to the social and economic structur~ 
have added greatly to the understanding of criminal acts as integral 
elements of social life, rather than exclusively as a matter of 
individual choice. 
Conclusion 
Poverty itself does not cause crime, but resentment of poverty does, 
and, curiously enough, resentment of poverty is more likely to 
develop among the relatively deprived of an affluent society than 
among the objectively deprived in a poor society. This is partly 
because affluent industrial societies are also secular societies; 
the distribution of goods and services here and now is a more important 
preoccupation than concern with eternal salvation. It is also because 
~ the mass media, to which television has been a recent but important ~addition, stimulate the desire for a luxurious lifestyle among all 
segments of the population. These considerations help to explain why 
the sting of socioeconomic deprivation can be greater for the poor in 
rich societies than for the poor in poor societies. In addition, 
they would also shed light on the high crime rates in many urban areas 
where the difference between rich and poor is even more pronounced; 
and on the increase in crime rates with the increase in general 
prosperity. Note that the positive relationship between crime and 
prosperity cannot be explained adequately by economic theory, alone. 
In an attempt to capture the effects of deprivation, the analysis 
to follow will include the distribution of income as an argument in a 
crime function. This is not meant to be an all-encompassing approach 
19 
to criminal behavior. Rather, an alternative economic model of urban 
property crime will be presented which maintains the concept of choice, 
but at the same time allows for preferences to be determined endogenously 
by the socially and economically induced stresses that our system 
inflicts on individuals. 
CHAPTER III 
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF CRIME 
The following is an economic analysis of criminal behavior. The 
approach taken treats crime as an aggregate consumer externality 
associated with the distribution of income. 
Consider a "polarized" urban area with a total population of "n" 
individuals, "r" rich and "p" poor: 
i = 1, 2, ••• , p, 
h = 1, 2, ••• , r, 
p+r = n. 
The poor are isolated from the rest of the urban population and unable 
to migrate from the ghetto to other peripheral areas. 
The_ type of criminal activity considered in this study is victim-
related. or more specifically, illegal activity such as property crime. 
Homicides are not included, since the population of the urban area is 
assumed to be unchanged at any given time. Moreover, it is assumed that 
only a subset of the urban poor commit the crimes in question and only 
amongst themselves--"white collar" crimes are not considered (Cohen, 
1981). Thus, in the case of property-related crimes, this would amount 
to a redistribution of wealth amongst the urban poor. Rising property 
crime rates, however, affect-all urban residents adversely through the 
fear of being victimized. Expenditures on handguns, security devices, 
and public deterrence serve the purpose of minimizing this apprehension. 
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The objective of the government in a competitive urban economy where 
all choose between income and other activities, is to maximize social 
welfare in the context of a "first best" environment. This simply means 
that the planner has a set of policy tools to insure the attainment of 
the "bliss point" on the population's utility-possibilities frontier. 
All markets are competitive and behavior can be adjusted in non-
competitive markets to generate the Pareto optimal results. The funda-
mental difference between this analysis and the other theoretical 
approaches to "optimal" distributions, is that the former employs an 
individual as well as a social view of the distribution of income: 
people judge their relative position on the income scale independently 
of society's social rankings (social welfare function). Criminal 
activity therefore becomes an "incidental" effect on our typical "poor" 
person resulting from the income-leisure choices of the "rich". 
Theory 
The income distribution is represented by the function "X( ):" 
where X a sum.rnary measure of the distribution of income, 
f - a function representing the subdistribution of the poor, 
y. - the income of a poor individual, i = 1, 2, .•• , p, 
l. 
g - a function representing the subdistribution of the rich, 
yh - the income of a rich individual, h == 1, 2, ••• , r. 
The distribution function is assumed to have the following properties: 
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f < g 
x (1) 
f = g, 
f > 0, g > o. 
"f" and "g" are always positive, and f :::_ g. The first and second order 
partials of "X" with respect to "f" -and "g" are: 
ax > 
df O, ax < dg 0, (2) 
a2x 2 
--< 0, a x > 0 ()f2 2 • ()g 
The shape of the function is depicted in Figures 1 and 2. 
x x 
1 1 
__ ...._ _____________ g 
0 f*=g 0 g*=f 
Figure 1. Distribution of f Figure 2. Distribution of g 
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Property (2) implies that as the poor become better-off relative to 
the rich ("g" constant), the distribution of income increases at a 
decreasing rate. Since f .2_ g, the maximum value of "X" is one which is 
denoted by f*=g in Figure 1. "f" can never reach zero by the assump~ion 
f > 0. From Figure 2 and Property (2), it may be seen that as the 
rich gain relative to the poor ("f" constant), the distribution function 
approaches zero. Again, since f < g, the value "g*" represents the 
point where X = 1. 
The third property of the function "X" is: 
ax ax i, j 1, 2, .•. , p 
--=--' ay. ay, 
l.. J 
i .; j 
(3) 
ax ax h, w = 1, 2, •.. , r 
ayh = ay-w • · h .; w 
Property (3) may be derived as follows. For simplicity, assume 
i,j =- 1,2: 
ax ax a£ ax af 
ayl = 3£ ay 1 ' =---af ay2 
A person's income 
individual income 
matters only in that a ceteris uaribus chance in 
. . ~ 
will equal the change in each subdistribution, 
affecting the aggregate distribution "X". Therefore: 
and 
3X 
=-3f • 
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The crime function (or number of offenses committed) may now be 
specified as a function of the income distribution and the probability 
of punishment (deterrent effect):' 
C. = C.(X(f,g),p) 
l. l. 
i = 1, 2, ... , p 
X - Distribution function 
c >' 0 i - . 
p - Probability of being arrested and convicted (p - "rho") 
(4) 
In accordance with previous assumptions, crime is committed only 
by the poor in this model--white collar crime is not being analyzed. 
The probability of punishment, "p", depends upon two things: the 
probability of being arrested and charged, "p ", and the probability 
a 
of being convicted of the crime if arrested and charged, "p " To 
c/a · 
compute "p", one may resort to the laws of probability: 
pc/a 
= _e_ 
pa 
p = pc/a 0 pa 
The probability of being arrested and convicted is equal to the 
probability of being convicted, given that the person has been 
arrested, times the probability of being arrested. "p" may be 
thought of as varying positively with the efficiency of the judicial 
system and police productivity. 
The crime function has the following properties: 
(1i__=l) ay. 
l. 
ac. ax 
<ax 1 2- O) <F > O) 
i = 1, 2, ...• p 
(5) 
(6) 
ac. cici ax (~= ac. <ax < O) 1 ax ag 2- 0 • 1 ) <ax1 .::_ O) (7) ciyh ayh Clg 
i = 1, 2, ••• ' p ~ h = 1, 2, ... ' r 
Property (7) infers that as the urban rich become relatively better-off 
in the eyes of the poor, the amount of crime the poor commit amongst 
themselves increases. Considering the "poverty amidst plenty" which is 
apparent in many urban areas, as well as the influence of media 
advertising, this assumption of awareness on the part of the poor is 
not unrealistic. 
If we aggregate over all poor individuals, the total amount of 
urban crime is obtained (s0rne "C "raay be zero): 
' i 
p 
C = E 
i=l 
C. = C (X, p) 
l. 
Since each individual faces the same distribution function and 
(8) 
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probability of punishment, aggregation is similar to that of determining 
market demand. Given an incomedistribution, "Xo" and probability of 
punishment, 11 p011 , the total amount of crime committed would be 11c011 • 
Increasing expenditures on crime prevention would increase "p" and 
reduce criminal activity to 11c111 (Figure 3). 
To off er a more complete theory of urban crime, equation (8) and 
its graphical representation must be analyzed more fully. First, 
consider the determinants of "p", the probability of punishment. 
Expected-punishment costs may be increased by increasing "p". How 
this can be done effectively is a complicated question, but potentially 
there are three ways to change the punishment probability: (a) increase 
the quantity and/or quality of resources available to the local 
criminal justice system; (b) increase the efficiency with which 
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resources are used by the system; and (c) reduce the existing constraints 
which may hinder the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. In 
terms of equation (5): 
p = p / (E) • p (P0 , K) , c a a 
E - efficiency of judicial system, 
P0 - quantity of police officers, 
K - capital utilized by law enforcement (weapons, communications, 
etc.), 
(9) 
(+) (+) 
ap 
ap - (E) ap - pc/a a ·-.>O, ClP 0 (10) 
·o 
(+) 
ap 
aK = pc/a(E) 0 
(+) 
(+) 
ap 
a 
3P 0 
(+) 
> 0 • 
Note that each marginal effect is dependent upon the value taken by 
the other variable. In other words, there is a certain degree of 
(11) 
interaction between the probability of being arrested, which depends 
upon law enforcement capabilities, and that of being convicted, which is 
dependent, in turn, upon the efficiency of the judicial environment. 
Property (10), for example, implies that adding more police would 
increase "p" and therefore the punishment probability, "p", But if 
a 
the courts happened to be lenient, or over-crowded, "p" may remain 
unchanged, due to the offsetting reduction in "p I ". 
. c a 
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x 
0 c 
Figure 3. Crime Function 
Next, consider the "technological" constraints facing the locality. 
The number of crimes prevented may be expressed in the following form: 
c = c (p I (E) • pa (PO, K) , X) , p p c a (12) 
c - Number of crimes prevented, p 
ac ac 
• ~> _E. = _E. 0 ' C3P0 ap C3P0 (13) 
(+) (+) 
ac ac -~> ___E. = ___E. 0 ' aK ap C3K (14) 
(+) (+) 
ac ac 
• ()p > 
___E. = ___E. 0 • aE ()p ()E (15) 
(+) (+) 
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Properties (13), (14), and (15) follow directly from (9), (10), and (11). 
Figures 4 and 5 depict the functional forms of Equations (12) and (13) 
respectively. 
c p 
0 P* 0 
Figure 4. Crime Prevention 
Function 
0 P* 0 
Figure 5. Marginal Product of 
Police Protection 
Equation (13) may be thought of as the "marginal product" of 
police protection. It declines because of the usual reasons for 
diminishing marginal returns. Holding all other factors constant, 
including the available capital, each additional officer will prevent 
less and less criminal activity. At "P$", the marginal product is zero. 
Changes in "E" and/or "K" will effect both "Cp" and "3Cp/3P011 , but 
perturbations in "X" (income distribution) will only effect the total 
of crime prevention ("C "). p 
We may now incorporate these results in the urban crime function 
and analyze their implications (Figure 6). 
c 
0 
-p=p p=p 0 1 
1 p 
Figure 6. Crime and the Punishment 
Probability 
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The above diagram (Figure 6) is the relationship between crime and 
the punishment probability--drawn from the assumption of a given income 
distribution. Along segment 11 C0A11 , crime may be reduced by increasing 
"p". (The crime prevented being, for example, c0 - c1.) This would 
be accomplished through increasing police protection ("P"), providing 
0 
more capital ("K"), or altering the judicial environment ("E"). 
Moreover, if "p" were to remain fixed, movement to a more equitable 
distribution would also reduce crime (a shift downward in 11c0AC(X0) 11). 
Now, assume for expositionary purposes that "K" and "E" remain fixed 
along 11c0A11 , so that: 
and p will only vary when "Po' changes. Thus, adding more police will 
increase "p", but will not reduce crime beyond "P~" (page 27). This 
is represented by point "A", above, where: 
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Increasing "o" past "po" will not effect criminal activity, which is 
totally determined by the prevailing income distribution along ''AC (x0) ". 
It follows, then, that crime may only be reduced in this region by 
either of two ways: redistributing income towards the poor (C(x 0) to 
C(X 1)) and/or changing the availability of law enforcement capital or 
the effectiveness of the courts. Increasing the latter would reduce 
crime along the dashed segment "AFB". At point "F": 
To summarize, there are a number of policy options available to 
the local government. Assuming diminishing marginal returns to police 
protection, crime may be reduced through any of the aforementioned 
methods. In addition, redistributing income will also be effective. 
If, however, the marginal product of additional police is zero, then 
the only options involve redistribution, provision of crime protection 
equipment, or a relaxation of existing judicial constraints. Some 
statistical studies have suggested that the marginal product of poli·ce 
is indeed zero, which would, in reality, provide some justification for 
arguing that these options are real (Wilson, 1974). The way in which 
this study differs from previous analyses of crime is its specification 
of relative income comparisons as an important determinant of criminal 
behavior. A further implication of this approach, however, is the 
economic consequences associated with interdependent welfare comparisons. 
If people view the distribution of income from an individual perspective, 
independently of social rankings, then this, along with a condition of 
anomie, becomes a necessary condition for the committal of a criminal 
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act. The degree of inequality is a public good with which some may be 
satisfied and others dissatisfied, but which everyone must "consume". 
To the extent that this is true, the market will not allocate correctly 
and the standard Pareto optimal outcomes will not apply. In the case 
of crime as a consumption externality associated with the distribution 
of income, the standard income-leisure choice will result in more 
criminal activity than is socially optimal. In the absence of voluntary 
redistributions, then, the role of the local government is to determine 
how to achieve this "optimal" level--whether through some kind of tax-
subsidy scheme or increased public expenditures on deterrence. The 
remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a derivation of the 
optimal tax-subsidy and its implications. 
A Condensed General Equilibrium Model 
Condensations of the full general equilibrium model are common in 
the first-best literature, and will be utilized here to analyse 
consumer externalities. When analyzing consumer externalities, the 
detailed production relationships of the model are not really necessary, 
since the primary interest is in the interrelationships among consumers. 
Thus, the idea is to simplify the usual, full model by emphasizing the 
essential consumption elements. 
In all public sector analysis, individuals' preferences are 
the fundamental demand data. For the urban area, ordinal preferences 
will be represented as follows (withou~ externalities): 
u. = u. (y., 8.) 
1 1 1 1 
i = 1, 2, ... ' p 
h = 1, 2, ... , r 
(16) 
yi, yh -·income of person i,· h· (alternatively, the "nurneraire" 
good with PY= 1), 
o. oh - single factor supplied by person i, h. 
l.' 
Factor supplies enter the utility function with a negative sign. For 
example, if labor (L) is the only factor, then: 
Le. = 24 L. , 
l. l. 
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where 24 is the total hours in a day and 24 - Lis a "good", leisure (Le). 
Assuming production is efficient and can be represented as an 
implicit' function: 
F(Y, !::,.) - 0 , (17) 
Y - aggregate income, 
6 - aggregate factor supply. 
F( ) has the following property: 
dF = ~~ dY + ~~ d6 - 0 , 
dY 'dF /'dl:,. 
dl1 = - 3F/3Y = MP6 (18) 
Thus, F( ) implicitly defines a production function whose derivative 
is simply the marginal product of the factor. The reciprocal of the 
"MP t:,." is known as the "marginal factor requirement". 
and 
Market clearance requires that: 
y = 
p 
L: 
i=l 
y. + 
l. 
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p· r 
f:. = L. 0. + z:: (\. 
i=l 1 h=l 
Incorporating these into F( ) : 
p r p r 
F(Y z:: Yi + z:: yh, f:. = z:: 0. + z:: oh) - 0 
i=l j=l i=l 1 h=l 
or 
n n 
F( z:: y i' z:: o.) - o. p + r = n j=l j=l 1 
(19) 
In addition, producers do not care who receives (supplies) an additional 
unit of a good (factor), that is: 
j = 1, 2, .•. , n 
With the above behavioral equations and constraints, the social 
welfare maximization problem becomes simple to represent: 
-+. 4-
Max: W(UJ., U2) (20) 
n n 
s. t.: F( z:: yj' z:: o.) = 0 j=l j=l J 
~ 
u1 - vector of utilities of poor, 
u2 - vector of utilities of rich. 
The function W( ) is the usual Bergson (1938) social welfare function 
found in the literature. This model is general enough to generate the 
relevant Pareto conditions, whether accomplished through free choice 
or the urban government. 
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Setting up the Lagrangian: 
n n 
z W(Ul' U2) + A:F( r Yi' r 
j=l i=l 
0.) 
1 
j, d = 1, 2, ••• , n; j :/: d (21) 
(22) 
and 
- oF 
-A:-311 j = 1, 2, ••• , n (23) 
These are known as the interpersonal equity conditions, derived from 
considering a single factor ("o") supplied by any two different people 
(j :/: d). Condition (23) says that interpersonal equity is achieved 
only if all factors are supplied such that social welfare is 
equalized for all, rich and poor, on the margin. This redistribution 
must be lump-sum, so that the dichotomy between equity and efficiency 
be maintained; in accordance with previous assumptions, the locality 
acts in an urban first-best environment. 
The Pareto conditions can be derived by considering the first-
order conditions with respect to one good (income) and one factor 
consumed by any one person: 
az = aw ~ + 1.:aF = 0 
oy . ClU • 3y • ClY 
J J J 
j = 1, 2, •.. , n (24) 
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~ = aw 3 + >.:aF = 0 
ao. au. ao. at:. (25) 
J J J 
(aw/ 0uj)( 0uj/Cloj) = ClF/al'.l 
(ClW/ClU.)(ClU./Cly.) ClF/ClY 
J J J 
After cancelling the social welfare terms: 
('JU./ 'do_) 
MRSj 
0. ,y. =· J J =M
Pt, ('JU./ oy .) j = 1, 2, ••• , n 
J J J J 
or, equivalently: 
MRSj 
y. ,o. 
J J 
= 
(ClU ./oy.) 
. J J 
(ClU./Clo.) 
J J 
1 
= -- ' 
MP fl 
j = 1, 2, ••• ' n 
where "I/MP 611 is the marginal factor requirement. Under competitive 
conditions, the MRS will be the same for all individuals, and profit 
maximizing firms will hire factor "6" until MP/::,= Pl::. (Py= I), so: 
Condition (28) is.the familiar optimal choice between income ("y.") 
J 
and leisure (if 11 011 represented labor time). 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
If the urban area approximates a competitive market, then it wi~l 
generate the Pareto-optimal conditions, but not necessarily the inter-
personal equity conditions (23). If the population is not neutral with 
respect to the distribution of income, then the government must act 
according to the dlctates of two additional sets of first-order 
conditions, the interpersonal equity conditions. With the existence of 
externalities, however, a perfectly competitive market will no longer 
generate a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources. Government inter-
vention is required, not only to satisfy the interpersonal equity 
conditions, but to keep the urban economy on its first-best utility-
possibilities frontier. 
Externalities 
To show in simple terms what effect externalities have on economic 
activity, consider the following example of two individuals, where 
one's c~nsumption of a good, say "X", affects the other individual in 
an adverse manner (an external "diseconomy"): 
Ul Ul(yl' xl, x2) 
u2 = u2 (y2' x2) ' 
Since individual two does not take into account the effect he/she has 
on person one, the competitive market will yield the usual outcome: 
36 
MR.Si = p 
· x.y. X i = 1, 2; Py = 1 (29) 
l l 
But this result is not.Pareto optimal, because the external "cost" 
imposed on person one is not accounted for. The efficiency conditions 
(to be derived) are: 
MR.SI = MRS 2 + MRSl = PX = MCX, (Py = 1) 
xlyl x2Yz x2yl 
MR.SI 
< o. (30) x2yl 
Note that in comparing individual two's competitive outcome (29) 
with condition (30), it is found that: 
MRS2 
XzYz 
so the marginal cost of "X" is "too high", implying an over-abundance 
of resources devoted to the production of "X". 
Handling criminal activity as a consumer externality requires 
additional assumptions regarding the behavior of the urban residents. 
It is assumed that all individuals, both rich and poor, view crime from 
an aggregate perspective; that is, no one cares who is actually 
connnitting a particular offense--individual identities are irrelevant. 
Thus, the external effect depends only upon the level of the prevailing 
income distribution. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the type of 
crime which appears in individuals' preference functions is victim-
related (excluding homicides). In terms of equation (8) (page 25) the 
. crime function may be expressed as: 
p 
~ ~ 
c = r c. = C(X(f (Y ) , g (Yr))) • 
i=l 1 p . 
~ 
y 
- vector of incomes of the poor p 
~ 
y 
- vector of incomes of the rich 
r 
If both the rich and po.or care only about the aggregate level of crime, 
then each will have a µtility function of the following form: 
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(31) 
i = 1, 2, .•• , p 
h = 1, 2, .•• , r 
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"U " and "U " have the following properties: i h 
aui aui aui ac ax 
--=--+------
ay. ay. ac ax af 
l. l. 
(32) 
i,s 1, 2, ... , p; i.; s (33) 
If the income of person "s" increases, the utility of individual "i" 
is affected because the relative position of the poor has improved (33), 
reducing aggregate criminal activity. Note ·that person "i" is not 
concerned with the identity of the individual (or individuals) who are 
better-off, but rather a changing distribution in "i's" favor. 
Alternatively, crime increases as the rich become more affluent, 
adversely affecting "i's" utility as the distribution shifts to group 
"g's" favor. When either person "i" or "h" increase their 
consumption (income), however, there are two different effects. The 
first term in (32) represents the independent effect on utility for 
both "i" and "h" as a result of the standard income-leisure choice. 
The second term is the indirect effect that each individual's choice 
has on the income distribution and therefore crime. In the case of 
the poor person, "i", he/she is aware that the distribution has changed 
favorably; this would reduce illegal activity and consequently increase 
"i's" utility. But since each individual reacts only to an aggregate 
formulation, in the process of the income-leisure choice, the indirect 
/ 
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effect is ignored. This behavioral assumption is certainly reasonable; 
no one realizes that their own personal activity may affect them 
beneficially or otherwise. The same may be said for the typical rich 
person, or individual "h". In this case, the choice for greater income 
affects "h" adversely, through higher crime rates. As previously 
mentioned, this does not necessarily mean that the rich are the victims; 
rather, they fear the prospect of being victimized. Again, person "h" 
ignores the effect that his/her income choice has on the income 
distribution. 
When an externality takes an aggregate form, it may be corrected 
by means of a single tax (or subsidy) placed upon each individual 
creating the external effect. This single tax is referred to in the 
literature as a "Pigouvian" tax, named for Pigou (1956). Other types of 
externalities are not so easily handled. For instance, external effects 
in which the identity of individuals matter, require that the government 
design a set of taxes, with a different tax levied on each individual. 
Given the problem of identification costs, correction of the externality 
may not be a Pareto-improvement. The above formulation of crime, with 
income and the prevailing income distribution being the externality-
generating activity, lends itself to the aggregate analysis. Thus, from 
an intuitive standpoint, one might initially guess that the poor should 
be subsidized (3U ./3y. > O) and the rich taxed (3U ./3yh < 0), since 
l J J.. 
neither take into account the external effects while maximizing utility. 
This would reduce crime to the optimal level, as the income distribution 
bec_ame optimal from a social welfare standpoint. 
The derivation of the single tax-subsidy case may be accomplished 
by considering social welfare maximization with preferences represented 
by (31): 
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n n 
s. t.: F( I: yJ., I: 
j=l j=l 
a.) _ o . 
1 
P + r n 
As before, the interpersonal equity conditions with respect to any two 
individuals' supply of factor 11 011 are: 
aw auj = _ A 3F 
au. ao. 31::,. 
J J 
j = 1, 2, ..• , n 
the same result as in (23), page 34. 
(34) 
The Pareto-optimal conditions will be derived for each sub-group, 
"p" and "r". For the poor, the first order conditions with respect 
to the ith person's income and oi are: 
aw aui A:aF 
au. 38." = 3ti 
1 1 
i = 1, 2, ••. ' p 
i = 1, 2, ..• , p 
Equation (35) implies that individual "i" receives satisfaction from 
his/her own personal income, but this enjoyment also affects others, 
as well as himself/herself, through the distribution and criminal 
activity. 
Dividing (35) by (36) yields the Pareto conditions: 
aw aui 
----+ 
. 3U. Cly. 
1 l 
n 3W 3uj 3C 3X I:--------~j~=_l_3u_J~· _3_c_3_x_3_f = _1_ 
3W ClUi 
3U. ao. 
1 1 
(35) 
(36) 
Since the interpersonal equity conditions have been satisfied (34), the 
social welfare terms (3W/3U.) cancel and: 
J 
au. 
l. 
ay. n 
__ i_ + E 
au. . 1 l. 3= 
ao. 
l. 
au· ac ax 
_]. __ 
ac ax d£ 
au. 
_J_ 
ao. 
J 
which may be written as: 
n 
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1 
=--
MP ti 
MR.Si ax E j cS + ~f MR.Sxs. 
Yi i a j=l u] 
i = 1, 2, ••• , p. (37) 
Note that: 
so: 
auj au. ac 
_ _J__ 
ax - ac ax ' 
au. 
_J_ 
ax 
auj 
acS. 
J 
. j 
= MRSXcS. 
J 
Utilizing the same procedure for the sub-group of the rich, the optimal 
condition is: 
n 
MR.sh + ax " MRsj 
s ~ ~ xs. yhuh og j=l u] h = 1, 2, •.• , r. 
(38) 
Both conditions (37) and (38) imply that the government should equate 
the personal rates of substitution between "Y" and "ti", plus the total 
of all individuals' valuations of a small change in the income distri-
bution in terms of cS .. 
J 
At this point, a significant limitation of this approach must be 
noted. In deriving the Pareto-optimal conditions, it was assumed that 
the interpersonal equity conditions held, so the welfare terms cancelled. 
This ability to cancel, however, is not merely an arithmetic procedure. 
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It implies the ability of government to redistribute lump-sum in order 
to attain the "bliss" point. Without "first-best" policy tools, the 
terms will not cancel and conditions (37) and (38) will not be the 
necessary ones for a social welfare maximum. This is essentially why 
the assumption of a "first-best" environment was made at the beginning 
of this analysis. The derivation of the conditions with a non-optimal 
distribut~on are handled by a "second-best" approach--an analysis that 
this study will not consider. 
Equations (37) and (38) may be rewritten as: 
n 
MR.Si 1 ax j =--
- aI L: MRSXo y.o. MP Li (39) ]. ]. j=l J 
MR.Sh 1 ax 
n j 
= -- - L: MRSXo. • Yh0h MP Li ag j=l J 
(40) 
Thus, each poor and rich person's marginal rate of substitution differs 
from the marginal factor product by the same amount, the total of all 
external effects. Since good ''Y" (or income) is the numeraire, Py = 1. 
Firms will set PLi = MPLi' or l/PLi = 1/MPLi' by profit maximization. Each 
individual, both rich and poor, will initially face the same price 
for supplying factor "Li", assuming the marginal external effects are 
ignored. To achieve Pareto optimality, then, the government may place 
a tax on the rich, "t", and a subsidy on the poor, "s", equal to 
(see Appendix A): 
t 
ax n j 
- - L: MRS 
Clg j=l Xoj 
(41) 
n 
ax j 
s = - L: M.RSxs. af . 1 u J= J 
(42) 
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Alternatively, a proportional income tax and subsidy may be used, rather 
than a unit tax. As seen in Figure 7, with the subsidy, the poor will 
adjust so that the reciprocal of the price received by them for 
supplying the factor will be below the marginal factor requirement 
(or the price above the marginal product): 
1 1 
-= 
pP MP b. 
6 
- s , 
pP - price received by poor. 6 
(43) 
The rich, after paying the tax, will receive a reciprocal price above 
the marginal factor requirement (or below the marginal product) 
(Figure 8): 
l 1 (44). =--+ t , 
Pr MP6 
6 
Pr 
6 - price received by rich. 
Both diagrams indicate an important property of the tax and subsidy: 
they must equal the sum of the external effects at the optimal level 
of the supplied factor. Setting them equal to the effect at the 
original competitive equilibrium is not correct ("ac" and "bd"). 
Although finding "t " and "s " is not a simple task, presumably 
opt opt 
the government can reach the correct formulation through a trial and 
error process. More specifically, if the functions "D", "S . " private;. 
and "S . 1 11 characterize a competitive factor market and the relevant. socia 
external effects, then a trial and error process will generate the 
optimal tax and subsidy in the limit (Baumol, 1972) (See Appendix B). 
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As a result of this tax-subsidy solution, the income distribution 
has changed in favor of the poor--a Pareto-optimal redistribution and 
criminal activity has also been reduced to its optimal level (Figure 9). 
x 
0 c 
Figure 9. The Optimal Level of Crime 
Voluntary Transfers 
An obvious question is whether, in the absence of government 
intervention, charitable transfers would achieve the same result as 
the tax-subsidy approach. In other words, would a Pareto distribution 
prevail without a tax-transfer program, implying an optimum crime rate. 
Consider the determination of an optimal transfer under the 
assumption that the costs of redistribution are shared equally by the 
rich. Each affluent individual has a utility function: 
h = 1, -2, ••• , r (45) 
whereas before: 
-'-
f = f(Y ) p 
-'-
g = g(Y ) 
r 
The tax paid by the rich is positively related to the dollar amount 
of income transferred: 
R = income transferred to poor, 
Substituting (46) in (45) as a function of yh, the optimal transfer 
occurs where: 
and: 
If the tax burden is shared equally: 
, where 
p = number of poor, 
r = number of rich, 
Equation (47) now becomes: 
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(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
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Thus, maximizing total utility from transferring income requires that 
the marginal benefit of the transfer (right side of (48)) equals the 
marginal cost (left side of (48))~ The marginal benefit is the 
increase in utility of person "h" resulting from a reduction in crim~, 
multiplied by the number of poor individuals. Note that a transfer 
initiated by any one rich person will benefit all affluent individuals. 
Therefore, a free-rider problem is likely to result without government 
intervention--there are not enough voluntary transfers. The marginal 
cost represents the individual's loss in utility from transferring 
income, multiplied by his/her share of the costs. According to (48), 
each rich person should prefer a government program to private charity, 
since all share the costs. Acting independently, the marginal costs to 
person "h" are ClUh/ClYh • p. It is easy to see that these costs would 
be reduced under general taxation (p > p/r). 
In retrospect, there is no reason to expect that charitable 
behavior would be suf.ficient to achieve an optimal distribution and 
reduce crime significantly. Society must resort to the tax-subsidy 
scheme. 
Policy 
Up to this point, this analysis has considered one way of handling 
criminal activity--as a consumer externality. Preventing crime depends 
upon preserving or attaining a leptokurtic distribution of income. 
There is another option, however, which is increasing the probability 
of .punishment. Referring to the diagram on page 26, increasing "p" 
will shift "C" to the left. Thus, the government may reach "C " 
opt 
by a Pareto redistribution or by creating deterrents. The choice 
would depend upon the relative cost-benefit ratio associated with each 
option. In reality, though, the movement from a non-optimum to an 
optimum level of crime implies only a potential Pareto improvement, and 
not an actual Pareto improvement. 
Consider first the costs involved with reducing crime through 
redistribution. The urban government may accomplish this through a 
general consumption tax on the rich and a consumption subsidy to the 
poor. Since this would correct the externality problem, there is no 
excess burden or efficiency cost involved. Note, however, that the 
subsidy is a multiple of the tax ((41) and (42)), or 
s = - 8X/8f t = 8X/8g E£ t df dg > 0 df 
48 
Thus, additional revenue must be raised in order to provide the subsidy. 
If this revenue is attained by distorting taxation, then the excess 
burden imposed would be a cost of redistribution. The locality could 
avoid this cost by lump sum taxation, and therefore face only the 
question of horizontal equity. So, it seems that the only real costs 
involved in this policy option would be administrative and compliance 
costs, and--perhaps the largest component--the costs of collecting 
information to determine the shape of the externality functions 
n j n j (8X/8g E MRSXo. and ax/'df L: MRsxo. ) (see Appendix B). j=l J j=l J 
The costs associated with reducing crime through deterrence are 
likely to be substantial. Assuming the marginal product of police 
protection to be zero, the alternatives involved would be to provide 
additional law enforcement capital and/or increase the effectiveness 
of the judicial system. Both options would entail opportunity costs, 
the loss of income in the private sector as resources are diverted into 
law enforcement. The types of costs here would be such things as 
collllllunication devices, police vehicles, weapons, salaries of judges, 
administrative-legal fees, prison facilities, etc. The list is long, 
and all costs resulting from crime reduction should be included; that 
is, a decision to provide more enforcement capital will surely mean 
more arrests, thus the costs of providing prison facilities for those 
individuals must also be included. Moreover, financing these 
expenditures will result in a welfare cost if the method of taxation 
is distorting. Given that municipalities receive revenue from property 
8;;Ild specific sales taxes, this burden is likely to be real and should 
be included in calculating the costs of deterrence. 
Benefits of crime reduction would be the same for each policy 
option. _Essentially, these would involve the reduction in costs that 
individuals bear as the result of crime, or the fear of it. For 
example, in the case of property crime, the benefits would be the 
value of the real property that was not destroyed as a result of less 
crime, and the reduction in psychic costs to victims and others, such 
as anger or fear. There are some "hidden" benefits, however, which . 
are not readily apparent. If the property is not destroyed, then it 
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is said that the net cost to society is zero, since only a redistribu-
tion among individuals takes place. But there is a real opportunity 
cost involved, which results from employment in crime-related activities. 
The value of the goods and services foregone because some people work 
as burglars, fences, etc., is a real cost. Less crime will reduce 
these costs and is a net benefit to urban residents. 
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Let us entertain the following hypothetical situation. Property 
crime is on the rise in New York City and the current administration is 
faced with the task of controlling it by the best means possible; 
that is, at minimum cost to taxpayers. Assume that the city government 
has all the "first-best" policy tools at its disposal--planners can 
simultaneously employ allocational policies and lump sum redistributions 
in order to maximize the s9cial welfare of the urban population. Thus, 
the objective is to choose that option which has the highest benefit-cost 
ratio. In this case, there are only two options: redistribution or 
deterrence. Through some means of reaching a consensus, it has been 
determined that crime is to be reduced by some percentage. From an 
economic perspective, this may or may not be the optimal reduction, but 
given that the politicians are assumed to act in accordance with the 
preferences of the urban population, this reduction may, for all 
practical purposes, be considered optimal. The relationship between 
crime, the distribution of income, and the probability of punishment is: 
C - urban crime rate, Rt 
t = 1, 2, ••• , T 
y 1, y2 - elasticity parameters, 
xt' pt - as defined previously in text. 
"T" is the current period and the parameters are assumed to be known. 
From this equatl·on the percentage changes needed i·n "X 11 and "v " may 
, " t 1 t 
be determined for any given reduction in crime: 
Met 6CRt 1 
. -
x t-1 CRt-1 Y1 
lip. 
t 6CRt 1 
= 
pt-1 CRt-1. Yz 
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Since the additional benefits would be the same for each option, 
the selection criterion would reduce to a comparison of additional 
expenditures (costs). Two additional equations may be observed, relating 
the probability of punishment and the income distribution to expenditures 
on crime prevention and redistribution, respective: 
Cll E:2t 
pt ao t_;lt e 
Bo 
Bl E:3t 
xt = t_;2t e 
t_: 1t expenditures on crime prevention at time "t", 
.;2t - expenditures on income redistribution at time "t". 
Given "!::.x /X " and "Lip /p ", the required changes in expenditures 
t t-1 t t-1 
are: 
.6.t;lt 
.6.CRt 
.;lt-1 
CRt-1 y ZCl'l 
!J.C C.:zt-1 lit; = Rt 
2t CRt-1 Y1B1 
Therefore, the locality would choose to redistribute income as a course 
of action if: 
or, 
Yz Bl .;lt-1 
-<----
Y1 al C.:zt-1 • 
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This expression depends upon the parameters of the three equations and 
the ratio of the previous period's expenditures. If y 1 > y 2 then to 
achieve any given decrease in urban crime requires a larger percentage 
increase in the probability of punishment than in the income distribµtion. 
This is not sufficient for accepting the redistribution option, though, 
because of the differences in expenditure elasticities and the expendi-
ture weights. The smaller "y2" is relative to 11y111 , and the larger 
"8 s 11 is relative to "a s " the more the locality should choose 1 lt-1 1 2t-l ' 
the Pareto redi.stribution option. 
Since the parameters of the three equations are not actually 
known, they must be estimated if comparisons are to be made between the 
additional costs of each option. If a time ordered sample were 
selected, the corresponding estimators of the parameters may be used 
in the comparison: 
"' 81 s2t-1 
a1 s1t-1 ' 
or rewritten in terms of magnitudes: 
The properties of the estimator 11S*" .are difficult to derive. Although 
we should theoretically be able to observe different values of 11S* 11 
for different observed samples, in the above formulation, "S*". will 
also vary with "s. 11 and "s ". Thus, fixed values of "19261 1" 2t-l lt-1 
and "iy1&1 1" will not yield a unique "S*", but 11 t-l 11 estimates. 
In order to overcome this problem, it will be assumed that 
slt-l ~ szt-l' or that the past levels of crime prevention and 
redistribution expenditures are approximately equal. Under this 
condition, the cost comparisons become: 
Y2 s1 (for 
s1t-1 szt-1) <- , ~ Y1 al 
and the new statistic "s"' 
may be utilized to test the relative cost effectiveness of the two 
options. It may be seen that this assumption is equivalent to a 
comparison of percentage changes of additional expenditures: 
6szt 
szt-1 
6s1t 
<---
slt-1 ' 
> _s_1_t-_1 
s2t-1 ' 
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That is, if the bases are approximately equal, a comparison of additional 
costs is the same as a comparison of percentage changes. 
For the City of New York, the mean ratio of crime prevention 
expenditures to social welfare expenditures over the period 1930-1981 
was .8862. Since this ratio is not significantly different from one, 
the assumption of approximately equal bases does not seem to be 
·unwarranted. 
In the scenario outlined above, the locality was assumed to be in 
a position to choose between the best option, redistribution or 
deterrence, depending upon which was the lower-cost alternative. The 
urban government may then proceed to provide the additional funds by 
raising whateven additional revenue is needed. In other words, the 
budget is variable. This is a necessary condition for achieving 
optimality, for if planners face budget constraints then the required 
expenditures will not be forthcoming and the optimal level of crime 
will not be achieved. It may be noted that this requirement of 
variable budgets coincides with the "first-best" assumptions made 
throughout this study. Government budgets constraints force "second-
best" solutions (Tresch, 1981). 
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CHAPTER IV 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Hypothesis and Variable Description 
The formulation developed at the end of Chapter III lends itself 
to an empirical test of the viability of income redistribution as a 
means of reducing criminal activity. The null and alternative 
hypotheses would be of the following form: 
(49) 
(50) 
The estimator utilized for the purposes of this test is: 
where: 
"S" has a limiting normal distribution c-1:.+) (see Appendix C), and 
H0 will be rejected when: 
(~s) < 
obs 
z 
c 'Cl 
where "z " is the critical value of a standardized normal distribution. 
c' Cl 
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The pararc Ler estimates, "y2", 11&111 , "l\", and 11y111 will be obtained 
from the following three equations: 
CRt 
yl Y2 £1t 
Yo x 1 pt-1 e , t-
pt ao 
a.I 
sit 
E2t 
e 
So 
Bl E3t 
x = s2t e t 
t = 1, 2, ... ,, 52 , 
where CRt an "index" of property crime, 
xt - the distribution of income, 
pt - the probability of punishment, 
~lt - expenditures on crime prevention, and 
szt expenditures on social welfare programs. 
The relevant population for this study is New York City, which 
(51) 
(52) 
(53) 
encompasses the five ·boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn~ Manhattan, Queens, 
and Staten Island. 
It is assumed that the crimes under consideration, robbery, 
burglary, larceny, and motor-vehicle theft are committed largely by 
those with incomes in New York City below the mean. This assumption 
does not seem to be unrealistic, since "the poor, uneducated individual 
with minimal skills is more likely to commit property crimes than the 
person higher up on the socioeconomic ladder" (U.S. National Commis-
sion on Law Observance and Enforcement, 1971, p.126). The NYC Police 
Department (December, 1981} has data on relative percentages by 
crime areas in the city over the 10 year period, 1971-1980. During 
this period, 66.7 percent, 40.1 percent, 58.4 percent, and 52.1 percent 
of the average number of offenses in robbery, burglary, larceny, and 
motor-vehicle theft respectively, were reported in the areas of 
Bedford-Stuyvesant in Brooklyn, South-Bronx in the Bronx, Jamaica 
in Queens, Harlem in Upper Manhattan, Jackson Heights in Queens, and 
Coney Island in Brooklyn. According to the New York 'City Department of 
Social Services Economic and Social Statistics (1971-1980), these areas 
are also among the most economically.-depressed in the city. This 
assumption of criminality among the poor is not meant to imply that 
lower income individuals are more "criminal" than the rest of the 
population--only that they are more likely to commit property-related 
crimes. To argue that the poor are more "criminal" than other classes 
on the basis of their offense rates for these crimes would be as 
indefensible as arguing that upper income groups are more "criminal" 
on the basis-of their offense rates for white collar crimes. 
The crime variable, CRt' is defined as an "index" of the crimes of 
robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor-vehicle theft derived from a 
canonical correlation analysis. This procedure is used to select the 
linear combinations of two sets of variables that maximize the correla-
tions between the combinations (Morrison, 1976). The "index" is the 
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linear compound of the crime variables which has the maximum correlation 
with the various compounds of "Xt-l" and "pt_1". The full procedure is 
outlined in Appendix C. 
In order for the variable Xt to have operational meaning, the 
arbitrary function, X( ), must be replaced with a specific one. One· 
specificat;i.on which has all the properties derived in Chapter III, is: 
xt 
Yb (54) =-
Y-a 
..... 
where Yb - mean income of individuals below the mean, and 
,... 
income of individuals above the ya mean mean. 
The definition of income used to calculate "Yb" and "Y " is 
a ' 
{
City Public Assistance 
Value Added + 
AFDC Payments 
and it is expressed in real terms. 
{ City Income Taxes 
Federal Income Taxes 
It is assumed that the standard of living of those with incomes 
above the mean provide the basis for relative welfare comparisons of 
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whose with incomes below the mean. "Y " may then be considered an aggre-
a 
gate "reference group". In an affluent society, those at the bottom of 
the income distribution evaluate both their present and future economic 
position with reference to the incomes of those at the top. This 
assumption implies that the economic position of the more affluent 
city dwellers generates the general feelings of malevolence· that 
result in criminal activity directed against the most available 
property or persons. 
"pt"' the probability of punishment, was defined in Chapter III as: 
or, as the probability of being convicted given the event of-being 
arrested and charged, times the probability of being arrested and 
charged. "p" may be rewritten as: 
n(c n a) 
p = n(a) 
n(a) 
n(C) 
n(c n a) - number of individuals arrested, charged, and convicted 
for committing property crime, 
n(a) - number of individuals arrested and charged for 
property crime, and 
n(C) - total number of property crime offenses. 
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As expressed above, "p11 is an a posteriori probability, and is easily 
computed from the available data. 
11 t;; 11 and 11 .; " are expenditures on crime prevention and redistri-lt 2t 
bution respectively. These amounts were obtained from the adopted 
New York City budgets for the years 1930-1981. "<:" 11 expenditures on 
"'2t ' 
social welfare, includes AFDC benefit payments, city benefit payments, 
and all administrative costs. 
According to Equation (51), the level of criminal activity depends 
on the potential criminal's perception of the income distribution and 
the probability of punishment. These perceptions are not formulated 
instantaneously, but with a lag. "X" and "p11 are assumed to be 
perceived with a one year lag (X 1, P 1). t- t-
A complete description of the above variables can be found in 
Appendix D. 
Empirical Model 
Equations (51), (52), and (53) may be rewritten as: 
. (56) 
(57) 
(58) 
where the "*11 represents the natural log of the variables. The 
endogenous and exogenous variables are CKt' X~, p~, and X~_ 1 , P~_ 1 , 
l;f t• l;~t respectively. The system of equations could be estimated 
individually using ordinary least squares, but more efficient (minimum 
variance) estimators may be obtained by allowing for the correlation 
of disturbances across equations (see Appendix C). The resulting 
estimators may then be used for testing the null hypothesis (49). 
It is assumed that the disturbances, Elt' E2t' and E3 t are 
correlated for different observations within equations and for the 
same and different observations across equations. This assumption 
may be tested by an examination of the estimated autocorrelation and 
cross-correlation function of the residual series, slt' s 2t' and s3t. 
The null hypotheses of "white noise" would be: 
H0 l:E(E.tE.t ) l J -T 0, 
H02:E(E.tE.t ) = 0, l J -T 
and the estimated functions: 
r (s.) T l 
r (s.£.) 
T l J = 
T 
I: £it sjt-/ 
t=l 
(i,j) = (1,1) (2,2) (3,3) 
T = 1, 2, ... , 9, 
(i,j) = (1,2) (2,3) (1,3) 
T = ±1, ±2, ••• , ±£, 
(i, j) (1, 1) (2,2) (3,3) 
T 
,...2 ) !z T A2 ) !z ( I: E. ( I: Ejt • (i,j) = (1,2) 
t=l it t=l (2,3) 
(1,3) 
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It may be shown that under the null hypotheses (Tiao et al., 1980, p. 25): 
r (s.) l:+ N(O, T-l), 
T l 
(A A) -1.+ N(O, T-1), r E.E. 
T l. J 
and 
T 2 L 2 Z r (s.)---+ x1(i), 
1=1 T l 
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T 2(A A ) r E.E. 
T 1 J 
H01 and H02 would be rejected when 2 > 2 and 2 > 2 Xlobs X1c,a Xzobs Xzc,a 
respectively. It is possible that one hypothesis would be accepted 
while the other is rejected. The estimation procedure.is developed 
in Appendix C, under the assumption made above concerning the error 
structure, alternative specifications could be made if both hypotheses 
are not rejected. 
The empirical results of the canonical correlation analysis, the 
estimation procedure, and the test of cost-effectiveness between 
redistribution and deterrence will be presented in Chapter V. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As mentioned in Chapter IV and derived in Appendix C, the crime 
"index" C* = 
' Rt Ln(CRt), is obtained through a canonical correlation 
analysis. The procedure yielded only one statistically significant 
correlation, between the linear compounds "u1" and 11v 111 , where: 
u 1 .8821 • Ln(R) - .3463 • Ln(B) + .3466 • Ln(L) + 
.1320 • Ln(MVT), 
v = 1 .9119 • Ln(Xt-l) + .1605 • Ln(pt-l) 
Corr(u1 , v 1) = .7701**, 
**significantly different from zero at a 
R - Robbery, 
B - Burglary, 
L - Larceny, 
MVT - Motor Vehicle Theft. 
= .01 (P(F > F b ) = 
0 s 
.0001), 
The correlation vector between "u " 1 and the variables "Ln(R)", "Ln(B)", 
"Ln(L)", and "Ln(MVT)" is: 
Ln(R) 
u 1 (.9974 
Ln(B) 
.9605 
Ln(L) 
.9374 
Ln(MVT) 
• 9684) 
Since all of these correlations are high and positive, "u1" is 
"capturing" virtually all the movement in property crime rates--high 
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or low values of 11u111 are very likely to be associated with high or 
low values of robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor-vehicle theft. 
"u " is thus a "weighted-average"' or "index" of property crime, 1 
representing the aggregate crime rate presented in Chapter III 
In order to determine the structure of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the disturbances, the null hypotheses presented in the 
preceding chapter will be tested utilizing the residuals of the 
three-equation system: 
0 (i,j) 1' = 1, 2, •.• , 24 
H02:E(E. E.t ) = 0 it J -T . (i,j) T = ±1, ±2, •.. , ±24 
For H01, the "x2" statistics are: 
T 51 •• 7376 37.6213, 
T 51 • . 7249 36.9684, 
24 
r;u:3) T L: = 51 . .7493 38.2158, 
T=l 
and for H02: 
24 2c ,.,. > T l: rT ElE2 51 . 1.2425 = 63.3651, 
T=-24 
24 
2(" " ) T L: rT El ~3 = 51 . 1.1807 60.2157, 
'T=-24 
24 2c ,.,. ) T L: rT E2E3 51 . 1. 2665 64.589. 
·T=-24 
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It may be seen from the above that the first hypothesis of no serial 
correlation within equations has been rejected, while the second 
2 2 
hypothesis has been accepted, since Xie, .OS.= 36.42 and x2c, .05 65. 
This implies a disturbance variance-covariance matrix of the form: 
where: 
0121 
<P22 
0321 
ij 
01 
0131 
0231 
= 
<P33 
<P' 
ij 
gT-1 
i. 
0 J 1 . 
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•. (i,j) (1, 1) 
(2,2) 
(3,3) 
and: 
i. 
OTJ = E ( E • • E • t ) , ( i , j ) l.J J -T T = 0, 1, 2, •. ., T-1 
i. 
a J i,j = 1, 2, 3, i j. 
The errors are correlated within equations for different observations 
and across equations for the same observations. 
Knowledge of the restrictions on the error structure allows the 
application of a simple two-step estimation procedure .to the three 
equations. First, each model is adjusted so as to eliminate the 
first order serial correlation within equations. ·This is accomplished 
by modeling the OLS residuals as a first-order 
and then transforming-the system. 
a. (B)s. 
l it 
A 
= v .... 
l] 
65 
autoregressive process 
i = 1, 2' 3 
The second stage is to simultaneously estimate all parameters in the 
above system allowing for the cross-equation correlation of the 
disturbances (Zellner, 1963). The final estimates are: 
/\ * c~t = 4.3445 - 1.1125 xt-l -
(5.889)x (-2.0055)x 
F b = 7.85 0 s 
P(F > 7.85) .0011 
p~ = -1.2166 + .1299 ~rt , 
(-8.1061)x (3.756)x 
A 
F b = 14.35 
0 s 
P(F > 14.35) = .0004 
x~ = -2.3789 + .2406 ~~t., 
(-15.2001)x (7.6709)x 
F b = 58.78 
0 s 
P(F > 58.78) = .0001 
.5163 p* 1 t-
( -3. 511) x 
R2 = .2504 
DW = 1.8324 
R2 = .2302 
DW = 1.8491 
R2 = .5505 
DW 1. 8644 
(59) 
a 1(B) = (1 - .1628 B) 
"' 11 = 1. 558 00 
(60) 
a 2 (B) = (1 - .1976 B) 
"
22 
= .0445 00 
(61) 
a3 (B) = (1 - .1603 B} 
,...33 00 = .0543 
( ) - "z" values in parentheses, 
x - denotes significant at .OS level, and 
DW - Durbin-Watson statistic. 
All coefficients are highly significantly different from zero except 
that of the income distribution in equation (59). The probability of 
observing a value less than -2.0055 is approximately .023, while the 
critical region for the two-tailed test is .025. It is interesting 
to note that the percentage change in the crime index due to a one-
percentage change in the income distribution (-1.1125) is twice as 
large as the respective coefficient of the probability of punishment 
(-.5163). Moreover, the same can be said of the elasticities of crime 
prevention and social welfare expenditures. 
At first glance, one might note that the relationship, 
Y2 81 
< ~ = .4641 < 1.8522 
holds for the estimated coefficients. The problem in a statistical 
sense, though, is to determine whether the difference, l.Y2;,11 - lr1B1 1, 
is significantly less than zero to warrant rejection of the null 
hypothesis: 
and acceptance of the proposition that income redistribution may be 
the more cost-effective way of cornbatting property crime. 
The statistic, "S", mentioned in the beg.inning of Chapter IV and 
developed in Appendix C is: 
A 
s -.2006 . 
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The estimated standard error of "S" (see Appendix C) is: 
as= .1207 
Since "S" is asymptotically distributed as a normal variate, 
" s 
and, 
L 
-+ N(O, 1) , 
-.2006 
• 1207 
-1.6619 • 
The critical value of "s;e"" s is -1.6449 at the .05 level, so it appears 
that redistribution had been a less expensive alternative for the city 
of New York, without any realization of this purpose. The probability 
of observing a value of -1.6619 or less is approximately .048. 
In summary, the estimated model has elasticity coefficients of the 
sign and magnitude hypothesized. Moreover, the magnitudes are large 
enough to warrant the labeling of redistribution as the lower-cost 
alternative. 
The Need for Sensitivity Analysis 
Although the previous analyses and empirical results have tended 
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to support the viability of redistribution as a means of reducing crime, 
many of the computed values had probabilities of being.observed that 
close to the rejection probability. Because of this closeness, an 
alternative specification of the error structure could have affected 
the magnitudes of the parameter estimates enough to reject the superior 
cost-effectiveness of the redistribution option. For example, the 
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test applied on page 61 determined the absence or presence of serial 
correlation both within and across different equations. The first three 
statistics tested whether serial correlation existed within equations 
(56), (57), and (58), and the remaining three statistics tested the. 
presence of serial correlation across the three equations (Chapter III). 
Note that the second and sixth observed values were very close to their 
respective critical values: 
T 51 •· • 7249 36.9684, 2 x = 36.42, le,. 05 
T 51 • 1. 2665 64.589, 2 x 2c, .05 65. 
If the null hypothesis E(c2 s 2 ) = 0 had been accepted and the null t -'[ 
hypothesis E(c2 c3 ) = 0 rejected, then an alternative error structure t t-'T 
would have resulted: 
¢ll 012I 013I 
E(EE') = 021I 0221 ¢23 = ¢*. 
031I ¢32 ¢33 
The only difference between this matrix and the one utilized in the 
actual estimation procedure are the partitioned matrices 022I and ¢32 , 
which represent no correlation across the disturbances in equation (57) 
and serial correlation between equatioas (57) and (58). The estimator 
of all regression parameters under the new specification is: 
and the original estimator was (see Appendix C): 
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A 
Thus different estimators will result, and the statistic, "S", which 
was a function of these estimators, will also be sensitive to the new 
A 
specification. Note, that the observed value of "S", -.2006, was very 
close to its critical value of -.1985. Therefore, it is likely that 
an alternative disturbance structure may result in a different conclusion 
regarding'which option has been more cost-effective. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was the development of an alternative 
economic approach to urban property crime. A general equilibrium model 
was developed in which criminal activity was specified as an aggregate 
consumption externality associated with the distribution of income. 
When the more affluent urban residents make income-leisure choices, 
ceteris paribus, these decisions will adversely affect the welfare of 
others through a changing income distribution and thus crime. The 
income-leisure decisions of those on the lower end of the socio-
economic scale, however, confer external benefits all urban residents, 
ceteris paribus, becquse crime is reduced through more relative equality. 
These external affects on welfare result because no resident takes into 
account the effects that changes in his/her own income has on the 
overall distribution. The typical "criminal" in this approach commits 
illegal acts partly because of a desire to improve relative income 
position. It is assumed that tastes and preferences are not exogenous, 
but are molded by our capitalist system which places great emphasis on 
monetary success with less regard for the means of achievement. 
The empirical model developed and estimated for New York City 
supports the theoretical proposition that property crime results 
partly from relative economic deprivation. However, criminals also 
respond to changes in the criminal justice environment, as reflected 
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in the probability of punishment. The model reflects the interaction 
among property crime, the probability of punishment, the income 
distribution, and public expenditures on crime prevention and social 
services. In testing the cost-effectiveness of redistribution versus 
deterrence as means of reducing crime, it was found that the hypothesis 
that deterrence is the lower-cost alternative could not be accepted, 
based upon the time-ordered sample. 
This analysis and its empirical results have important implications 
for public policy. It is generally thought by economists that 
deterrence is the most effective means of reducing crime. This 
follows from the notion that certainty and severity of punishment will 
increase expected punishment costs, ceteris paribus. This relationship 
is considered invariant with respect to time or place; that is, the 
institutional setting is considered unimportant. The results of this 
study, however, indicate that one cannot simply analyze property crime 
outside the context of the social and economic structure. If 
individuals are not ultimately responsible for their own actions, 
then policy would clearly be mis-directed. The implication that more 
resources should be devoted to redistribution rather than deterrence, 
however, does not necessarily follow from this study. Equation (61) 
in Chapter V shows a .24 percent change in the income distribution 
with respect to a one percent change in social service expenditures. 
Over the period 1964-1981 administrative and salary costs for this 
city department grew 42.3 percent. Administering these programs 
more efficiently could yield a larger change in the income distribution 
for the same change in expenditures. 
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Finally, there are some implications for further research that 
could be explored. Alternative specifications for the income distri-
bution could be utilized in the same model specification. For example, 
as mentioned in Appendix B, "X" could be of the form: 
b a 
xl L: Yi I L: yh , 
i=l h=l 
where b number of individuals below aggregate mean, and 
a - number of individuals above aggregate mean. 
The function "X " is expressed as a ratio of total incomes. Another 1 
formulation is: 
x2 - Y I Y b,a a,a 
where "a" is· a specified percentile of the income distribution. For 
example, Yb,. 25 would be the mean income of the lower 25 percent and 
Y 25 the mean income of the upper 25 percent. No matter what a,. 
formulation of the income distribution is chosen, it is imperative 
that the function exhibit the theoretical properties derived in 
Chapter III. Any ratio would be consistent with these properties and 
would maintain the concept of "relative comparisons. 
In addition to alternative income distribution specifications, 
different target populations may be utilized. The same analysis· 
could be applied to a cross-sectional sample of cities in the United 
States, or to census-tracts of urban areas, given available data. 
New York City was chosen because of its compatibility with the 
theoretical model and because the necessary data were available to 
the author. Not only are there "pockets" of high crime areas in each 
borough, but these areas also tend to be associated with the lowest 
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relative income levels (e.g., Harlem, South Bronx, Jamaica, Bedford-
Stuyvesant). Given this "poverty amidst plenty", New York City proved 
·to be an appropriate subject for 'this study. 
It might be noted that using different populations and/or alter-
native measures of distribution with the same model specification as 
in this study, would enable a more thorough investigation of the 
relative income effects. Moreover, the hypothesis that redistribution 
is the lower cost alternative could be examined utilizing data that 
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is less aggregated. This would be more useful from a policy perspective, 
since programs may then be "targeted" to those areas where relative 
income is the lowest. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Baumol, W. J. "On Taxation and the Control of Externalities." American 
Economic Review, 51(1972):82-96. 
Beccaria, Cesare. On Crimes and Punishments. New York: Bobbs-Merrill 
Co.,' 1963. 
Becker, C. S. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." The 
Journal of Political Economy, 76(1968):169-193. 
Bentham, J. The Works of Jeremy Bentham. Edited by John B. Bowrling. 
Edinburg: Singkin, Marshall, and Co., 1843. 
Bergson, A. "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 8(1938):111-126. 
Block, M. J. and Reineke. "A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal 
Choice." American Economic Review, 65 (19 7 5) : 314-325. 
Blumstein, Alfred, Cohen, Jacqueline, and Nagin, Daniel, eds. Deterrence 
and Incapaeitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions 
on Crime Rates. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 
1978. 
Banger, W. Criminality and Economic Conditions. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1969. 
Chatfield, C. and Collins, A. J. Introduction to Multivariate Analysis. 
London: Chapman and Hall, 1980. 
Cohen, Albert K. The Delinquency Subculture. Edited by Rose 
Giallombardo. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1976. 
Cohen, Lawrence E. "Robbery Victimization in the U.S.: An Analysis 
of a Nonrandom Event." Social Science Quarterly, 62(1981): 
644-657. 
Coljanni, Alfred C. Crime and the Social Condition. 'New York: McGraw 
Hill Book Co., 1959. 
Cook, P. "The Correctional Carrot: Better Jobs for Parolees." Policy 
Analysis, 1(1975):11-15. 
Easterlin, R. A. "Does Money Buy Happiness." The Public Interest, 
10(1975):113-123. 
74 
75 
Ehrlich, I. "A Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Investigation." Journal of Political Economy, 
81, 3(1973): 521-566. 
Ferri, Enrico. Criminal Sociology_. New York: Appleton and Co., 1896. 
Fleischer, Belton. The Economics of Delinquency. Chicago: Quadrangle 
Books, 1966. 
Forst, Brian. "An Analysis of Interrelationships Between Crime and Its 
Determinants." Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analysis, 1975. 
(Mimeographed.) 
Friedlander, Stanley L. Unemployment in the Urban Core. New York: 
Praeger, 1972. 
Glaser, Daniel and Rice, K. "Crime, Age, and Unemployment." American 
Sociological Review, 24(1959):679-686. 
Gordon, David. "Class and the Economics of Crime." The Review of 
Radical Political Economics, 3(1971):51-75. 
Hochman, Harold M. and Rodgers, James D. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution~" 
American Economic Review, 49(1969):542-557. 
Horton, Paul. "Problems in Understanding Motives." In The Economics of 
Crime and Punishment, ed. Simon Rottenberg. Washington, D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy, 1975. 
Kraus, M. and Mohring, H. "The Role of Polutee Taxes· in Externality 
Problems." Economica, 81(1975):89-110. 
Layard, P. R. G. and Walters, A. A. Micro-Economic Theori. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1978. 
Leonard, J. W. "Dismissal for Off-The-Job Criminal Behavior." Monthly 
Labor Review, 90(1967):21-27. 
,, 
Lenihaw, Kenneth J. Unlocking the Second Gate. Washington, D.C.: 
U. S. Department of Labor, Government Printing Office, 1976. 
Lindeman, Richard H., Mercenda, Peter F., and Gold, Ruth z. Introduction 
to Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis. Dallas, Texas: Scott, 
Foresman and Co., 1980. 
Marx, Karl. The Marx-Engels Reader. Edited by Robert C. Tucker. 
Manifesto of the Communist Party. New York: W. W. Norton and 
Co., Inc., 1978. 
Merton, Robert K. "Social Structure and Anomie." American Sociological 
Review, 3(1968):672-682. 
Morrison, Donald F. Multivariate Statistical Methods. New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1976. 
New York City Department of Social Services. 
Statistics. New York City, New York: 
Economic and Social 
1930-1981. 
New York City Police Department. Monthly Crime Reports. New York 
City, New York: January 1930-December 1981. 
Office of the Mayor of the City of New York. New York City Budgets. 
New York City, New York: 1929-1981. 
Pigou, A. C. The Economics of Welfare. 4th Edition. London: 
MacMillan, 1956. 
Piere, Michael. "Public and Private Responsibilities in On-The-Job 
Training of Disadvantaged Workers." Cambridge, Mass.: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978 (mimeographed). 
Portnay, B. "Employment for Former Criminals." Cornell Law Review, 
70(1970):121-130. 
Pownal, George A. "Employment Problems of Released Prisoners." 
Manpower (January, 1971):26-31. 
76 
Rao, C. Radhakrismna. Linear Statistical Inference and Its Applications. 
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965. 
Samuelson, Paul A. "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 36(1954):387-389. 
Staaf, Robert and '.!:'annian, Francis, eds. Externalities, Theoretical 
Dimensions of Public Economy. New York: Dunellew Publishing Co., 
Inc. 
Taggart, Robert. "Manpower for Criminal Offenders." Monthly Labor 
Review (August, 1972):17-25. 
Thurow, Lester. "The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85, 2(1971):92-102. 
Tiao, G. C., Box, G. E. P., Grupe, M. R., Hudak, G. B., Bell, W. R., and 
Chang, I. The Wisconsin Multiple Time Series (WMTS~l) Program: 
A Preliminary Guide. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 
1981 (Mimeographed). 
Tittle, Charles. "Punishment and Deterrence of Deviance." In The 
Economics of Crime and Punishment, Simon Rottenberg (ed.).~­
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy, 
1973. 
Toby, Jackson. Affluence and Crime. Task Force Report on Juvenile 
Delinquency and Youth Crime.· President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1967. 
.Tresch, Richard W. Public Finance, A Normative Theory. Plano, Texas: 
Business Publications, Inc., 1981. 
Tulluck, Gordon. "Does Punishment Deter Crime?" The Public Interest, 
36(1974):103-111. 
U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reports for the 
U. S. Washington, D.C., 1930-1981. 
U. S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement. Report on 
Causes of Crime. U. S. Department of Justice. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971. 
Wilson, J::imes W. "Do the Police Prevent Crimes?" The New York Times 
Magazine (October 12, 1974), pp. 18-19; 96-101. 
Zell'fler, A. "Estimators of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: Some 
Exact Finite Sample Results." Journal of American Statistical 
Association, 58 (1963):977-992. 
77 
.APPENDICES 
78 
APPENDIX A 
IMPOSITION OF A "RECIPROCAL" TAX 
79 
80 
The imposition of a tax is not usually seen in the literature in 
terms of the reciprocal of the factor price. It will be shown that the 
two approaches are essentially equivalent and involve simple arithmetic 
manipulation. 
Consider the factor involved to be labor time, measured negatively: 
o.=£.<o. 
J J 
j = 1, 2, •.. , n 
The individual problem is to make an optimal choice of yj and £j: 
Max: U. = U. (y., £.) 
J. J. J J 
s.t. y. = w£. 
J J 
w - real wage • 
(P = 1) y 
The conditions for a maximum are: 
or: 
MRSj 
y.'l. 
J J 
=w 
1 
= 
w 
In market equilibrium: 
MRSj 
y. 'l. 
J J 
1 1 
= - = 
The imposition of a proportionate income (consumption) tax drives 
a wedge between the wage received by suppliers and the wage received by 
producers: 
w8 - wage to suppliers, 
wp - wage to producers, 
T - tax rate. 
In equilibrium, after the tax: 
or: 
t = TW: p 
where "t" is the unit tax. 
In terms of the reciprocal wage, after the tax: 
or: 
(1) 
(2) 
Note, that in (1), "t" is negative, since wp > w8 , and in (2), "t" is 
positive since _!_ < 1 
WP wS 
The divergence between 
wage is: 
llW II 
p and "w " in terms of the reciprocal s 
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and: 
1 1 
This is equivalent to the usual case: 
or: 
APPENDIX B 
DETERMINING THE OPTIMAL TAX AND SUBSIDY 
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The determination of the exact form of the externality functions 
may prove to be an impossible task. An approximate method will be 
offered here. 
The largest problem facing the government would be determining 
n . 
. E MR.Sia. , the urban population's valuation of the income distribution 
J=l J 
in terms of a factor supplied. In its original fomulation, this would 
be impossible for two reasons. First, the costs involved of identifying 
each individual would be prohibitive. Second, given the non-exclusive 
nature of the good "X" (publicness), the government could not determine 
its true valuation because of non-revealed preferences. Therefore, a 
way around these problems would be dichotomize the population, assume 
valuations to be identical within each group, and then to estimate these 
group valuations. 
n . 
E MR.Sia may be written as: 
j=l j 
n 
- E MR.Sj 
Xa. j=l J 
p - number of poor, 
r - number of rich. 
Assuming that MR.SXa are equivalent within each group, the above becomes: 
P r A rough estimate of MRSXcS andMR.SXa may be obtained from the linear 
models: 
a = ao + alxt + E tp t (1) 
t = 1, 2, ... , T 
cS = s0 + s1x + µ tr t t. (2) 
"6 " and "6 " could be hours of work effort in the ghetto district tp tr 
and other areas respectively, or the classification could be made in 
terms of income. The distribution function, which has all the 
properties of the hypothetical distribution function mentioned 
throughout this analysis, is: 
xt 
or 
y 
=_p_=r 
- p y 
r 
p 
2:: Yi 
i=l 
r 
E yh 
h=l 
p 
2:: Yi 
i=l 
r 
E yh 
h=l 
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Thus,_ "a1" and 11 6111 would provide rough approximations of MRS~6 and MRS~0 . 
Since ax/3f = 1/Y and ax/ag 
. r 
functions become: 
3X. n j 
-;:;-- l: MRSX.rc . 
of . l v J= J 
- 1 
--
y 
r 
A A 
y A A 
(Y /Y 2), the externality P r 
- _p_ (pa + rB 1) • y.l 1 
r 
(3) 
(4) 
From these, the optimal tax and subsidy may be determined (see Figure 10). 
1 
Pb. 
0 
Figure 10. 
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MFP 
The Optimal Tax 
The tax, "t", is initially set equal to "a0 , the marginal damages at 
the original equilibrium level. The new equilibrium after the tax will 
settle at "l" on MFP. The marginal damages have been reduced to "b", 
so the tax is adjusted to equal "b". This will bring the equilibrium 
level to "2". Again, the tax is adjusted to equal "c", and the trial 
and error process approaches "6.opt" with t = 9, in the limit. 
r ' 
APPENDIX C 
EMPIRICAL HETHOD 
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Canonical Correlation 
The objective is to derive a? "index" of property crime through the 
procedure known as canonical correlation analysis (Lindeman, Merenda, 
Gold, 1980). 
For the general case, assume that a vector of p + q random 
variables has been partitioned in the following manner: 
..... ..... ..... 
y I = (XI XI) 
1 2 
..... 
X' 1 
.... 
X' = 2 
..... 
The variance-covariance matrix of "Y" may be partitioned as: 
From this population a sample of size n has been drawn, and the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix is: 
The question is what are the linear combinations (canonical variates), 
__,_ 
u. 
1 
aj_X1, i = 1, 2, ... , s 
__,_ 
v. = bj_X2, 1 
with the property that the sample correlation of u 1 and v 1 is gr.eatest, 
the sample correlation of u2 and v 2 is greatest among all linear 
compounds uncorrelated with u 1 and v 1, etc., for all s = min(p, q) 
possible pairs? It may be shown that the eigenvalues ("A.") obtained from 
the determinantal equations: 
or 
are the squared product-moment cor:relations of the iths Ii.near 
compounds: 
R2 = .A. 
u.v. 1 
1 1 
To derive the weights, a. and b., the following systems of linear 
1 1 
equations may be solved: 
where .Ai is the ith largest root. 
In order to interpret the results of a canonical correlation 
analysis, it is necessary to determine which variables in a set are 
most highly correlated with a given canonical variate and which least. 
The variance-covariance vectors of u.' xl' and v., x2 are respectively: 1 1 
.... .... .... 
cov(u., Xl) ·- E[ (a~ (Xl - µl)) ((Xl -µ1)')] 1 
= a~ L:ll 1 
.... 
cov(v., X2) = b~ L:22 1 1 
or, in sample form: 
A 
.... 
cov(u., Xl) = a! sll 1 1 
.... 
822 • cov(vi' X2) b~ 1 
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Each of the elements of the above vectors may be transformed to corre-
lat ion coefficients: 
;q--" 
& /a' corr(u., x .. ) = sll a. . a j = 1, 2, ... , p l. l.J uixij i l. x .. l.J 
" 
&vixij// aj_ s22 Ir corr(v., x .. ) = a. . - j = 1, 2, q l. l.J l. xij ... , 
Suppose a single variable was needed for an analysis that would 
"capture" most of the movements in a set of related variables. This 
single variable should be positively and significantly related to its 
parent set of variables. Canonical correlation provides a method for 
selecting such an "index". Consider the crime equation formulated in 
the text: 
where "Ln(CRt)" was defined as an "index" of property crime. This 
"index" may be written as: 
Ln(CRt) = a 1 Ln(R) + a 2 Ln(B) + a3 Ln(L) + a4 Ln(MVT) , 
R - robbery. 
B - burglary • 
L - larceny, 
MVT - motor-vehicle theft, 
(see Appendix D - Data Sources) • 
To derive "Ln(CR )", the weights, a , w = 1, 2, 3, 4, must be chosen in 
t w 
some optimal fashion. In terms of the procedure outlined above, the 
p+q = 4 + 2 = 6 variables are: 
91 
~ Xi= (Ln(R), Ln(B), Ln(L), Ln(MVT)), 
and the linear combinations: 
u = 1, 2 
Since there are only two pairs of canonical variates (s = min(p,q)), 
the "index" "Ln(C )" would be that value of u. which has the maximum 
' Rt ' i 
correlation with v. (largest eigenvalue). Once chosen, the relationship 
J. 
between "Ln(CRt)" and the property crimes may be examined through the 
correlation vector. These correlations should be positive and high 
(by convention, greater than .25) (Chatfield and Collins, 1980). 
Interpreting "Ln(CRt)" through the crime equation presents no 
difficulty. Under the hypothesis that y 1 < 0, increases in the distri-
bution function would reduce the index, and consequently reduce property 
crime. 
Theoretical Model Specification 
The estimation of the three equation model may be accomplished 
through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), but more efficient estimates 
would be obtained by allowing for correlations among the error terms, 
both within the same equation for different observations and across 
equations for the same and different observations. 
The three equations may be written as: 
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t = 1, 2, ••• , T, 
where "*" denotes the natural log of the variables. In matrix notation, 
the model'becomes: 
Y = zrz + s 
where Y = 3Txl V€ctor, 
Z 3Tx7 matrix, 
0 
I;* 1 
0 
Q = 7xl vector, and 
E = 3Txl vector. 
According to the aforementioned assumptions, there is serial correlation 
within equations and cross-equation correlation of the disturbances: 
= E(EE 1 ) 
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where: 
.. • ... 
oij 
1 
¢ij = i,j = 1, 2, 3 
i = j 
oij 
0 
crij 
T = E(SitE:jt-T)' T = 0, 1, 2, . ~ .. ' T-1 
and: 
crij 
0 
oij 
... 1 
aij 
-(T-1) 
ij 
al • 
<t>ij = aij i,j 1, 2, 3 , 
-1· 
.i .; j 
oij .. ij aij 
T-1 ~l 0 
' . 
crij 
= E(E.tE.t ) , T == 0, ±1, -±2' ±T-1 
T" 1. J ,..T ... ' 
The most efficient estimator of "Q" is therefore: 
A ~ = (Z'¢-1z)-l Z'¢-lY , 
and the variance-covariance matrix: 
A -1 -1 Cov (Q) = (Z'¢ Z) . 
In practice, the elements of "¢" must be estimated. These estimators 
are: 
"·. 
T A 
01J 
= 2: s. s. I T' T it Jt-T i = j; t = 0, 1, 2, ••• , T-1 t=T+l 
T A A 
"i. 
0 J = 2: c E: I T. 
T fr jt-T i -:/: j ; T = 0, ± l , ±2, ... , ±T-1 t=l 
A 
The distribution of "S" is derived by resorting to large sample 
theory. All of the least-squares estimators have a limiting normal 
distribution: 
IT (y. 
1 
yi) ~ N(O, lim T 0~ ), 
Yi 
a.) ~ N(O, lim T o~ ), 
i ai 
IT ( B. - 6.) ~ N (O, 1 im T 0~ ) • 
1 1 Si 
i = 0, 1, 2 
i 0, 1 
i = 0, 1 
The limiting mean and variance of "S" is derived by a Taylor expansion 
around the points (y 1 , Y 2 , · ~\, a 1): 
The series is: 
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The asymptotic mean is therefore: 
A 
lim E(S) :::: Yz al - Bl Y1· 
A 
The variance of "S" is: 
2 2 2 2 2 
+ 
2 2 
+ 82 2 + Za1 (J,., :::: al (JA + Yz fJA Y1 OS (J A Yz (JA A s Yz al 1 1 Y1 YzCi'l 
2a1 y1 0" "' - 2a B YzB1 1 1 2y2 Y1 
2y2 81 
the limiting variance-covariance matrix of the estimators, "Q" is: 
lim cov(Q) = ~ plim ( 
The elements of which are the individual limiting variances and 
covariances of the estimators. Since o~ is a linear combination of a 
s 
subset of these elements, 
2 2 lim 2 2 lim 2 2 lim 2 + B2 lim 2 + lim 05 ~ al Ct" + Yz 0"" + Y1 0-" (JA Yz al t\ 1 Y1 
2aly2 lim O" A - 2alyl lim (JA ~ - 2al Bl lim a·,.,_ A y2a.l Yz 1 Y2Y1 
2y2y1 lim (Jr. A 
a.2 61 - 2Y2~1 lim 
QA A + 2y l'\ 
alyl 
lim 0-" A 61y1, 
r. 
which is the limiting variance of "S". 
The variance of "S" may be consistently estimated by replacing 
each of the parameter and variances-covariances by their corresponding 
estimators: 
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So: 
A 
plim n = n , 
.... 
plim cov(f2) 
A 
1 z·¢-1z -1 
= T plim ( T ·) 
1 1 . i 1¢-1z- -1 
= T p im ( T ) 
= lim cov(~) 
;.... _1.--+ W "' N ( 0, 1) • 
s 
But since as is not known, it must be proven that: 
Let r 
A 
S -1.+ W"' N(O,l) • 8$ 
and plim r Then: 
s 
0" s 
By a limit theorem in large sample theory (Rao, 1965). Therefore: 
s ..h.rwrvN(O,l) 
0§ 
The null hypothesis would be rejected when: 
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" 
P( ~ 
cr 
<zb )<a. 0 s 
. for some specified "a." level. 
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APPENDIX D 
DATA SOURCES 
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1. 
Data Sources 
C - A canonical variate which is a linear combination of the Rt 
following property crime rates: 
a. R number of robberies per 100,000 population 
b. B - number of burglaries per 100,000 population 
c. L number of larcenies per 100,000 population 
d. MNT - number of motor-vehicle thefts per 100,000 population 
For a complete definition of crimes included in these categories, 
see United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime 
Re£orts for the U.S., annually. Data was obtained from New York 
City Police Department, Monthly Crime Reports, January 1930-
December 1981. 
Ideally, one wants the number of crimes committed; in fact, the 
city crime reports contain only crimes reported to the police, and 
this is known to be an underestimate of the true crime rate. One 
can only assume that the ratio of reported crimes to actual crimes 
has been constant over time. 
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2. Xt - As defined in text 
Data on the income distribution for each year were obtained from 
the New York City Department of Social Services, Economic and Social 
Statistics, 1930-1981. The distributions were expressed in real 
terms through deflation by the Consumer Price Index. Inc·ome is 
defined here as money income + city and federal ca.sh transfers -
city and federal income taxes, for the period 1945-1981. In the 
earlier years, 1930-1944, only unadjusted money income was available. 
In order to find the mean above the mean and the mean below the 
mean from data initially given in ten income classes, the following 
functions were fitted for each year: 
a. N. = f (Y.) 
1 ]. 
b. Yi g(Ni) 
total number of people who have incomes up to income Y. 
]. 
Y. - cumulating mean of incomes up to income Y ]. i 
i = 1, 2, .•. , 10 income classes 
From the aggregate data, the overall mean, "Y11 , was known for 
100 
each distribution. ·Substituting Y into equation (a), "nb", the 
number of individuals with income up to the mean was derived. Then, 
by substituting "nb" into equation (b), the mean of those with 
inco~es up !O the mean, "Yb", was derived. Since na = nT - ~ and 
Ybnb + Yana Y = , Yb was also derived. 
nT 
3. n(c n a), n(a), n(C) - as defined in text 
Data were obtained from New York City Police Department, Monthly 
Crime Reports, January 1930-December 1981 and United States Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the U.S., 
annually. 
4. r: r: - as defined in text 
""It' "'Zt 
Expenditures on crime prevention, "i;it"• included budget 
allocations for the following categories: 
1) Police Department 
a) Crime prevention and control 
b) Investigation and apprehension 
c) Emergency service 
d) Support 
e) Employee fringe benefits 
f) Employee .salary and wage adjustments 
2) Criminal Court 
a) Executive management 
b) Judicial 
c) Fringe benefits 
d) Employee salary and wage adjustments 
3) Department of Corrections 
a) Executive management 
b) Administrative and departmental services 
c) House of detention for women 
d) Male detention institutions and court detention pens 
e) Rehabilitation 
f) Employee fringe benefits 
g) Employee salary and wage adjustments 
h) Overtime pay 
"t;2t" included budget expenditures for the following social 
service categories: 
1) Department of Social Services 
a) Executive management 
b) Departmental services 
c) Public assistance (includes AFDC benefits) 
d) Employee fringe benefits 
e) Employee salary and wage adjustments 
Data were obtained from the New York City budgets, 1929-1981. 
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